Illinois Supreme and Appellate Court Case Summaries

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4 Appellate Cases Posted 1/30/08

10 Appellate Cases Posted 1/29/08

11 Supreme Court Cases Posted 1/22/08

1  Civil Practice: Appellate and Circuit Court  Affirmed; Refiling after one cause dismissed by motion.  Second cause refiled: Because dismissed cause not refiled, plaintiff cannot litigate dismissal of dismissed cause   Thomas, CJ.,  Kilbride and Fitzgerald, JJ, dissent.

  In 1998, a five-year-old Chicago boy died as a result of an acute asthma attack. Although his mother had dialed 911, the vehicle that was initially sent did not have advanced life-support capabilities, but was a fire truck, and an ambulance did not arrive for 15 minutes. This scenario was the basis for a wrongful-death complaint filed against the city, its fire commissioner, and other fire department personnel. In 1999, one of the counts, alleging negligence, was dismissed with prejudice by the circuit court of Cook County on the basis of the immunity provided by the Emergency Medical Services (EMS) Systems Act. No interlocutory appeal was taken. Another count, however, was not dismissed at this time. It alleged willful and wanton misconduct and remained pending for nearly three years until the plaintiffs took a voluntary dismissal without prejudice in 2002, as permitted under section 2–1009 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Under section 13–217 of the Code, voluntarily dismissed claims may be refiled within one year, and the plaintiff did this in 2003, bringing a new complaint that alleged only one count for willful and wanton misconduct, premised on the allegation that the defendants had been aware that the boy had previously suffered severe asthmatic episodes at his home. In response, the defendants asserted res judicata, the circuit court dismissed, and the appellate court affirmed.
         In this decision, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, despite the statutes on which the plaintiffs relied, case law has held that a plaintiff who splits his claims by voluntarily dismissing and refiling an action after a final judgment has been entered in another part of the case subjects himself to a res judicata defense. After dismissal of the negligence count, plaintiffs could have litigated their willful and wanton claim to a conclusion, but did not do so. Res judicata applies to claims which could have been litigated, but were not. The plaintiffs had an opportunity to litigate all of their claims, but chose to voluntarily dismiss part of their case and commence a second action, after part of their case had been finally determined in a previous action

2.  Preemption: Traffic Obstruction:L Appellate and Circuit Courts Reversed: Ordinance in conflict with and preempted by Federal Railroad Law: Burke, J.

This St. Clair County litigation concerns a railroad grade crossing on Monsanto Avenue west of Route 3 in Sauget. Relying on a section of the Illinois Vehicle Code known as the blocked-crossing provision, the plaintiff business enterprises, in 2003, sought to enjoin defendant railroad from blocking the crossing for more than 10 minutes. The circuit court initially entered a preliminary injunction and, after an evidentiary hearing, entered a permanent injunction. The appellate court affirmed.
       This appeal is governed by a recent Illinois Supreme Court decision in another case. In Village of Mundelein v. Wisconsin Central R.R., No. 103543, filed this same day, a village ordinance had adopted by reference the same Vehicle Code language. In that case, the village had fined a railroad for blocking a crossing. The supreme court held there that the ordinance violated the commerce clause, was preempted by federal railroad law, and was unenforceable. That same reasoning applies here. Therefore, the circuit court should not have issued any injunction. The cause was remanded with directions to dissolve it.

3.  Child Support: Appellate Court Reversed, Trial Court Affirmed: termination of parental rights by juvenile court does not terminate support obligation;   Freeman, J., Kilbride, J dissented, joined by Fitzgerald and  Karmeier, JJ.

No. 103289   Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family   Filed 1-25-08 (LJD)

In this Adams County case, the natural father of two children had entered into an agreed judgment of parentage in 1996 and was ordered to pay child support. Later, in 2002, his parental rights were terminated. On the basis of this, he petitioned the circuit court in 2005 for vacation of the support order on the theory that termination of parental rights relieved him of support obligations. He relied on section 17 of the Adoption Act, which states that “[a]fter *** entry of an order terminating parental rights *** the natural parents of a child sought to be adopted shall be relieved of all parental responsibility for such child.” The circuit court denied the petition, and the Illinois Supreme Court, in this decision, agreed, noting that there was no evidence that the children were, or had ever been, in the process of being adopted, and the father did not so argue. The appellate court’s decision to the contrary was reversed.

4.  Post Conviction Relief: Appellate and Trail Court Affirmed: No allegation in petition that defense counsel knew of facts that he allegedly failed to investigate.  Freeman, J.

In 2001, this offender was arrested for a 4 a.m. stop-sign violation at Princeton Street and China Place in Chicago. There was a scuffle with the police officers, who later produced photographs of bruises Delton had inflicted. In the circuit court of Cook County, a judge sitting without a jury entered convictions on two counts of aggravated battery of a police officer. Because of Delton’s extensive criminal record, he was eligible for extended-term sentencing and received concurrent 10-year terms, one for each conviction. The appellate court affirmed.
         A pro se postconviction petition was filed. Delton claimed his trial attorney was ineffective in failing to investigate possible witnesses to the event and in failing to investigate his claims that he had been harassed by these same officers before and had filed complaints against them. The circuit court summarily dismissed the petition as frivolous or patently without merit and the appellate court affirmed. 
         In this decision, the Illinois Supreme Court also affirmed because there was no factual support for the petition’s allegations that counsel knew before trial of Delton’s allegations that he had been harassed or had filed complaints. Neither was any information provided as to witnesses to the incident or what they might have to say. The absence of this factual support was not explained.

5.   DNA Sampling:  Trial and Appellate Court Affirmed: Privacy provisions in Juvenile Court Act do not apply to DNA Samples.  Burke, J. 

No. 103541 In the Interest of Lakisha M., a Minor   Filed 1-25-08 (LJD)

 In 2004, this minor got into trouble at Collins High School in Chicago after she fought with another girl and then hit and kicked the school dean as he attempted to break up the dispute. In the circuit court of Cook County, she was adjudicated delinquent on the basis of the felony offense of aggravated battery. She has since completed her sentence of probation and does not challenge the delinquency adjudication. However, she claimed in this appeal that it was unconstitutional to apply to her, a minor, the Illinois DNA indexing statute, section 5–4–3 of the Unified Code of Corrections, which requires felons to submit specimens of blood, saliva, or tissue to the Illinois Department of State Police for DNA-sampling purposes. She particularly complained that her offense was not sexual in nature. The appellate court had rejected her claims. In this decision, the Illinois Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute as applied to this individual and found that the Juvenile Court Act’s provisions making juvenile proceedings confidential do not call for a different result. The appellate court judgment was affirmed.

6.  Preemption: Appellate Court affirmed  reversing Trial Court: Federal railroad law trumps county ordinance on obstruction of crossing.  Kilbride, J.

No. 103543 The Village of Mundelein, v. Wisconsin   Filed 1-25-08 (LJD)

         In 2005, a freight train operated by the Wisconsin Central Railroad blocked Hawley Street in the Village of Mundelein for over 2½ hours. Twice during this period, Metra trains arrived at the village station, and disembarking passengers were unable to get to their cars in the parking lot because of the obstruction. On each occasion, the train was separated to let passengers through, and was then reconnected. The train had been having air brake problems, which caused the delay.  The railroad was prosecuted under a village ordinance for blocking the crossing for more than 10 minutes. This ordinance adopts by reference the blocked-crossing provision of the Illinois Vehicle Code. After a bench trial in the circuit court of Lake County, an ordinance violation was found and a fine of $14,000 and costs was imposed.  The appellate court, however, reversed, finding the village ordinance, in regulating the movement of trains at highway grade crossings, is preempted by federal railroad law. In this decision, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed.

7.  Indemnification:  Appellate and Trial Courts Affirmed:  Indemnification agreement in Equipment lease valid even for lessor negligence:  Garman, J.

No.  103562   Buenz v. Frontline    Filed 1-25-08 (LJD)

 In 2003, a multiple-vehicle collision involving a tractor-trailer occurred on Interstate 90 in McHenry County, resulting in the deaths of 8 individuals and injuries to 12 others. Twelve separate lawsuits were filed and were eventually consolidated in the circuit court of Cook County. Several defendants were named. Defendant COSCO provided the shipping container, or trailer. The rig was driven by defendant Vincente Zepeda, who drove under a contractual arrangement with defendant Frontline Transportation Company, an interstate freight transport provider. COSCO and Frontline operated under an “equipment interchange agreement.” COSCO was successful in obtaining a circuit court ruling to the effect that this agreement called for COSCO to be indemnified by Frontline for any losses COSCO might incur, including those caused by COSCO’s own negligence. The appellate court affirmed. In this decision, so did the Illinois Supreme Court, finding that this was what the agreement clearly provided.

8.  Criminal Law: Appellate and Trial Court Reversed: Jury InstructionsEven if provocation concede by State, elements of homicide must still be proved by state.   Fitzgerald, J.,  Thomas, CJ. dissents

No. 103751 People v. Mohr  Filed 1-25-08 (LJD)

         In 2001, a woman who was last seen in an East Moline tavern, with this defendant, was found dead a week later in her home about three miles away. The scene was a bloody one, and the State presented evidence that the defendant had been there, including forensic testimony as to a print matching the defendant’s big toe. The defendant denied that he had killed the victim and, at trial, presented no evidence.
         A Rock Island County jury trial took place in which defendant was charged only with second degree murder. First degree murder was not alleged. It was announced to the jury that the prosecution “conceded” that there had been provocation (a mitigating factor which can reduce first degree murder to second degree murder). After the State rested, and also at the instruction conference, the defendant objected that provocation was being injected into the case when there was no evidence of it. Nevertheless, the judge gave an instruction on provocation.
         Defendant was convicted. In posttrial motions and on appeal, he complained that the provocation instruction was improper as not based on the evidence. The appellate court reversed. In this decision, the Illinois Supreme Court also agreed, rejecting the State’s claims that this issue had not been properly preserved for review. The court found the error not to be harmless because the defendant had denied involvement and the circumstantial evidence of guilt was not overwhelming.
      The supreme court stated that, in this situation, in which only second degree murder was charged, the State still had to prove the elements of first degree murder, i.e., that the defendant perpetrated the homicide. Although the State conceded provocation as a mitigating factor, and, thus, was entitled to verdict of only second degree murder, no instruction on the mitigating factor of provocation should have been given because this confused the jury. The only elements which should have been instructed on were whether defendant stabbed and choked the victim as alleged, knowing that his acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm.

9.   Criminal Law: Sentencing: Affirmed: Ineffective counsel  Thomas, CJ.

No.103777   People v. Deleon   Filed 1-25-08 (LJD)

 In 1997, there was a multiple shooting at Mannheim Road and Schiller Street in Franklin Park. This defendant fired shots at the driver of a vehicle, wounding him in the chest with a bullet that exited the rear of the victim’s body. As the defendant kept firing, he also struck the driver of an ice cream truck as well as a three-year-old boy and a seven-year-old girl who were nearby. The girl was killed, but the automobile driver who was fired upon survived to testify at the defendant’s Cook County bench trial. Deleon was not convicted concerning the injured boy and the ice cream truck driver, but was convicted of first degree murder in the death of the girl and for attempted first degree murder as to the shooting of the motorist. He was originally sentenced to a mandatory life term for the death and a consecutive 30-year term for his attempt to murder the motorist.
         Later it was determined that the mandatory life term was not statutorily authorized and a new sentencing hearing was ordered. That resentencing hearing is the subject of this appeal. At it, Deleon received a 100-year extended-term sentence for murder and, again, a consecutive term of 30 years for attempted murder. The appellate court affirmed.
         In this decision, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s claims that his attorney at resentencing had been ineffective. It also rejected the claim that the motorist the defendant attempted to murder had not received severe bodily injury for purposes of consecutive sentencing. The results below were affirmed.

10.  Civil Procedure: Appellate and Trial Court Reversed: Relation back doctrine on amendments to complaints: Thomas, CJ.

This plaintiff was involved in an automobile accident in 2001. He was taken to Decatur Memorial Hospital and was there for 36 hours prior to surgery. His medical malpractice claim filed in the circuit court of Macon County against the hospital complained of his treatment there before he was operated on. His timely pleadings alleged that a loss of function occurred in his legs because the hospital failed to diagnose and treat his diminishing neurological function. Later, after the applicable limitation period had expired, he filed a second amended complaint alleging that the hospital had failed to properly read and interpret a CT scan. Although initially this complaint amendment was allowed, the defense was successful in having it dismissed on limitations grounds as not “relating back,” under section 2–616(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure, to earlier, timely pleadings. The circuit court then revised its earlier ruling allowing the amendment. The appellate court affirmed.  In this decision, the Illinois Supreme Court found that the last pleading amendment related back and should be allowed because what the plaintiff was complaining about was his hospital stay of a day and half and he should be permitted to plead details of that stay insofar as they concerned the injury he alleged. The cause was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.

11.   Real Estate: Appellate Court Affirmed reversing trial Court: Real Estate Tax Reproaration; mistake of fact; merger into deed doctrine   Fitzgerald, J.

The plaintiffs in this Cook County suit purchased an Orland Park home in 2005. At the closing, real estate taxes were prorated based on an amount shown on the title commitment. Apparently, neither the buyers nor the sellers knew that this figure was based on only a partial assessment. Plaintiff buyers received a credit, but later discovered that the taxes they were required to pay were much higher due to the error. After the sellers refused to make up the difference, plaintiffs sued for a reproration. Defendant sellers moved to dismiss the complaint under the doctrine of “merger by deed” and were successful in the circuit court. The appellate court, however, reversed.
         In this decision, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court, recognizing mutual mistake as an exception to the doctrine of merger by deed and finding the application of this exception appropriate in these circumstances. The court said that the complaint should not have been dismissed and that further proceedings on it should take place. As ordered by the appellate court, the cause was to be remanded.

4 Appellate Cases Posted 1/22/08

10 Appellate Cases Posted 01/15/08

1.  Domestic Relations: Reversed and Remanded: Use of life insurance to secure maintenance 9not to secure child support) not allowed under the Marriage and Dissolution Act.   Carter, J.

2.  Post Conviction Relief: Affirmed with Mittimus Modified: Issue of incorrect calculation of credit for time served may be raised in post conviction petition. Bowman, J.

3. Criminal Law: Affirmed: Excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule and elements thereof;  O'Malley, J.

4.  Sup. Ct. Rule 308: Appeal dismissed: Review of zoning  laws and special use permits.  Discussion of the difference between grants of zoning applications (legislative act) and denial of special use (administrative act) which is reviewable under Administrative Review Act.:Libertyville special use permits are legislative acts.  Grometer, J.

5.  Property Tax  Review: Affirmed: Historic cost v. fair market value assessment of the parcels: burden of persuasion;   O'Malley, J.

6.  Sales Tax: Affirmed: Board's decision affirmed; purchaser is not village but separate entity   Bowman, J.

7.  Consumer Fraud Act:/Arbitration: Reversed:  Applicaibilty of Arbitration Clause and Federal Arbitration Act; Unconscionable Application of Clause;  Substantive unconsionabiliy;    O'Malley, J.

8.  Mental Health: Psychotropic Medication: reversed: Order for administration of drugs must list who will administer:   Hutchinson, J.

9.   Supervision: Reversed:  Within 30 days, prosecutor can file motion to vacate dismissal of case because of supervision .   Notice of Motion is not a motion.  McLaren, J.

10.  Insurance Law: Reversed: duties of excess carriers to each other; bad faith in negotiating the underlying case.  Goldenhersh, J.

3 Appellate Cases Posted 01/08/08

1. Mechanics Lien; Affirmed:Final Invoice establishes date of completion of work for subcontractor's lien: Repair work does not extend lien.   Rob't. Gordon, J.

2.  Contribution Act: Affirmed: Contractual Contribution clause in construction contract; Pure indemnification agreements are void;   Garcia., J.

3.  Criminal Law: Affirmed: No prejudice shown by the defendant to support allegations that the grand jury testimony of witnesses before indictment was done to preserve their testimony;also statements which were substantially similar to grand jury testimony and could have been used to impeach witnesses.   Rob't. Gordon, J.

15 Appellate Cases Posted 01/03/08

1.  Juvenile Justice: Affirmed: Factors for evaluation of eyewitness identification; time lapse and degradation of memory;proof of mental state for aggravated battery.  Murphy, J.

2.  Criminal Law: Affirmed: Elements of home invasion are reviewed; use of the word "remains" in statute discussed; propriety of sentences discretionary with trial court;  Callum, J.

3. Magnuson-Moss Act: Reversed: Proof of damages by lay witness;  foundation necessary for witness to testify to diminution of value of new car because of defects.  Gallagher, J.

4.  Criminal Law: Affirmed: Definition of "under the influence of alcohol"; Admission of HGN test results without a FRYE  hearing not a prejudicial error because other evidence clearly showed defendant was guilty of DUI;;    O'Mara Fossard, J.

5.  Tax Sale & Redemption: Affirmed: Trial court has power to extend the period of redemption under general equitable powers.   Jos. Gordon, J.

6.  Tort Immunity:Affirmed: Tort Immunity Act section 5/106 applies not 2-202, which involves executing the law: No question of fact existed even though willful and wanton conduct usually is a question of fact.  Quinn, J.

Forcible Detainer: Reversed: Public interest exception to Mootness Doctrine: Use and Occupancy allowed by Section 9-201 Act--No provision for awarding immediate possession for failure to pay use and Occupancy; Court can not award possession without a hearing to determine landlord's right to possession.   Greiman, J.

8.  Jurisdiction: Reversed: Section 2-209 of Civil Practice Act does not confer jurisdiction over defendant who did not do business in Illinois and only rendered services in Indiana.  Unintended listing in South Suburban phone book not enough to confer jurisdiction; discussion of the :effects" test to confer jurisdiction. Greiman, J.