Plaintiff Rosemary Mulligan brought
this putative consumer class action lawsuit against defendant QVC,
Inc., for violations of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive
Business Practices Act (the Consumer Fraud Act) (815 ILCS 505/1 et seq.
(West 2004)) and unjust enrichment. Mulligan alleged that QVC’s listed
“retail value” overstated the prevailing market price for certain
products it sold and falsely created the impression that consumers were
receiving a bargain by purchasing at lower QVC prices. The circuit
court denied Mulligan’s motions for class certification, finding that
individual issues of law and fact predominated. Thereafter, the circuit
court granted QVC’s motion for summary judgment on Mulligan’s
individual claims and denied her cross-motion for summary judgment,
ruling that Mulligan
failed to create a genuine issue of material fact to support the
elements of her consumer fraud and unjust enrichment claims.
2. Legal
Malpractice: Affirmed: Motions to Dismiss; Trial Court correct is
dismissing Plaintiff's complaint as complaint was not timely (statutes
of limitation and repose for legal malpractice actions). Opinion:
Greiman, J.
No.1-07-1966
Joyce
v. DLA Piper Rudnick Gray Cary LLP, filed 5/7/08. (RJC)
Plaintiff
Edward Joyce, individually and on behalf of similarly situated
stockholders of 21st Century Telecom Group, Inc. (21st Century),
appeals from the trial court’s order dismissing his amended legal
malpractice complaint in favor of defendant DLA Piper Rudnick Gray Cary
LLP pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code)
(735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2006). In addition, defendant cross-appeals the
trial court’s order denying its motion to dismiss the original
complaint pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West
2006)) based on the timeliness of that complaint in relation to a
tolling agreement entered into by the parties.
3. Appeals:
Affirmed: Appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction;; order was a final
order in a section 2-1402 proceeding and that, therefore, under Rule
304(b)(4), it was immediately appealable without a special finding.
Opinion:
Theis, J.
No.1-08-0140
D'Agostino
v. Lynch
filed 5/7/08. (RJC)
Plaintiffs and
counterdefendants Mary Carr D’Agostino and Mario D’Agostino (the
D’Agostinos) appeal from the order of the circuit court denying their
motion for turnover against third-party citation respondents Eugene E.
Murphy, Jr., and Bryan Cave, LLP. Murphy and Bryan Cave have filed a
motion to dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction, contending that
the D’Agostinos failed to timely appeal from the denial of turnover
order. We agree and dismiss the appeal.
4. Insurance
Law: Reversed: Appellate
jurisdiction proper; trial court erred by granting summary judgment for
appellees based on estoppel. Defendant did not have a conflict of
interest and that the policy does not otherwise cover plaintiff's
liability.
Opinion:
Bowman, J.
No.2-06-1166
Stoneridge
Development v. Essex Insurance filed 5/6/08. (RJC)
At issue in
this case is whether Essex Insurance Company (Essex) is required to
provide coverage to its insured, Stoneridge Development Company, Inc.,
as well as to an additional insured under the policy, Highland Glen
Associates (collectively Stoneridge). The policy came into play after
homeowners John and Marie Walski brought suit against Stoneridge for
damage to their townhome, allegedly caused by Stoneridge's construction
of the residence on and/or near improperly compacted soil. The Walskis
also sought relief from Residential Warranty Corporation and its
underwriter, Western Pacific Mutual Insurance Company (collectively
WPIC), which had provided a warranty against structural defects to the
home. In the instant case, Essex appeals from the trial court's grant
of summary judgment in favor of Stoneridge, WPIC, and the Walskis. The
trial court ruled that Essex had an undisclosed conflict of interest
with Stoneridge and was therefore estopped from denying coverage. We
reverse.
5. Criminal
Procedure/Sexually Dangerous Person: Affirmed: Evidence
overwhelmingly favored continued commitment in a secured facility.
trial court was not required to hold a further evidentiary hearing on
the matter.
Opinion:
Cook, J.
No.4-07-0438
In
re: the Commitment of Blakey filed 5/1/08. (RJC)
In an 18-month
reevaluation report performed in March 2007, Dr. Robert Brucker
recommended that respondent, Robert W. Blakey, should (1) continue to
be found a sexually violent person and (2) be ordered to conditional
release in the community as long as he demonstrates a willingness to
cooperate with his plan. On March 28, 2007, the State filed a
motion for a finding of no probable cause under section 65(b)(1) of the
Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 to warrant an evidentiary hearing to
determine whether Blakey is still a sexually violent person. The
trial court conducted a probable-cause hearing to determine whether a
further evidentiary hearing was necessary to determine whether
Blakey was still a sexually violent person or whether Blakey was ready
to be conditionally released. The court heard argument from the
attorneys regarding the contents of Dr. Brucker's report. In a written
order that same day, the trial court entered an order finding no
probable cause to warrant a further evidentiary
hearing. Blakey appeals, arguing that, based on Dr. Brucker's second
recommendation, probable cause existed to warrant an evidentiary
hearing to determine whether Blakey has made sufficient progress to be
conditionally released or discharged. We affirm.
6.
Criminal Law/Post-conviction petition: First stage dismissal;
Trial court's court substantial compliance with the requirements of
Supreme Court Rule 402 when the court mentioned MSR to defendant during
the court's admonitions prior to defendant's guilty plea did not
violate defendant's due-process rights. Trial court appropriately
dismissed defendant's post conviction petition. Opinion:
Myerscough, J.
No.4-07-0395
People
v. Holborow filed
5/1/08. (RJC)
In January
2005, defendant, Jesse G. Holborow, entered into a negotiated plea to
home invasion with great bodily harm to the victim, theft (subsequent
offense) and criminal trespass to a vehicle. In exchange
for the plea, the State dismissed four other charges and the trial
court sentenced defendant to concurrent sentences of 16 years in the
IDOC for home invasion, 3 years for theft, and 364 days for criminal
trespass to a vehicle. Defendant filed a motion to reduce sentence,
which the court denied. He did not file a direct appeal. In April
2007, defendant filed a pro se post conviction petition under the
Post-Conviction Hearing Act wherein he alleged violation of the
terms of his plea agreement because he had not been admonished that he
would be required to serve a three-year term of mandatory supervised
release (MSR) upon his release from prison. Several days later, the
court summarily dismissed the post conviction petition as frivolous and
patently without merit. We affirm.